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ABSTRACT 
 
When raising equity capital through the recently opened Shanghai stock exchange, Chinese 
companies can issue stock to Chinese nationals (‘A’ shares) or to non-Chinese nationals (‘B’ 
shares).  Between 1990 and 1996 40 issuances of ‘B’ shares took place, often by firms that had 
previously issued ‘A’ shares.  These class ‘B’ initial offerings are found to exhibit underpricing 
relative to first day trading prices, but to a much less severe degree than class ‘A’ share IPOs.  
Indeed, the extent of underpricing of class ‘B’ shares is found to be in line with underpricing in 
the U.S. This is surprising because for the most part these offerings are hybrids of IPOs and 
seasoned equity offerings, representing offerings of old (traded) claims in a new market setting.  
We examine a variety of standard explanations for underpricing of IPOs finding either no 
empirical support for the hypotheses, or that many of these explanations are not relevant to the 
characteristics of the Chinese market. 
 
Two features of Chinese IPOs particularly seem to set them apart from new issues in the U.S.  
First, the capital market is not fully established, and second, the issuer of all IPOs is the 
government.  The Chinese IPOs represent an attempt to transform a non-market economy, 
therefore, the prime objective may be the very creation of a viable market mechanism rather than 
a mere maximization of issue proceeds.  We examine whether underpricing may be explained by 
this desire by the government (who also happens to be the issuer) to establish a market, and 
suggest a variety of lines for future research to cast further light on this hypothesis 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
he emergence of stock markets in the People‟s Republic of China (PRC) in December 1990 allows a 
unique opportunity to examine the issuance of initial public offerings (IPOs).  It is widely established, 
in the context of a variety of international stock markets, that IPOs are broadly underpriced in the sense 
that the average issue price is below the average after-market price.
1
   IPO underpricing has also been found in China 
with regard to the issuance of a class of shares issued only to Chinese nationals (known as Class „A‟ shares) by Datar 
and Mao (1997)
2
.  In this paper we examine the pricing of a companion set of shares, class „B‟ shares, which have in 
common almost all of the attributes of class „A‟ shares, except that class „B‟ shares are available only to non-Chinese 
nationals.  What makes these shares particularly intriguing is that a number of them are issued after the issuance of 
class „A‟ shares, so that these class „B‟ shares have a flavor of both an IPO and of a seasoned equity issue.  Class „B‟ 
shares offer essentially all the same rights as class „A‟ shares, hence the existence of seasoned class „A‟ shares would 
seem to provide a publicly available benchmark price.  Despite this we find evidence of consistent underpricing of 
class „B‟ shares.  The degree of underpricing for class „B‟ shares is comparable to that found in the US and other well 
developed stock markets for IPOs.  The level is surprisingly high, particularly for those B shares that can be 
considered a seasoned offering.  We examine a variety of possible reasons for this underpricing, finding that for the 
most part explanations developed to explain IPO underpricing in the US are either irrelevant or lack empirical support 
in the Chinese context.   We offer, as a possible explanation for the underpricing in the Chinese context, the hypothesis 
that the goal of the government in setting IPO prices is not necessarily revenue maximization, but rather that the 
T 
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government is concerned with the creation of a viable market mechanism.  Underpricing may be a reputation building 
device, with IPO prices to foreigners set at a level that allows them to earn returns on Chinese IPOs similar to those 
that they can expect to earn by investing in IPOs on other financial markets.  Essentially the Chinese government may 
be acting as a price taker in the international IPO market.   
 
 The remainder of this study proceeds as follows:  Section 2 describes the institutional setting, the sources of 
data and provides descriptive statics for Chinese IPOs; Section 3 provides empirical analysis of a variety of theories to 
explain IPO underpricing; and Section 4 concludes with a summary of our findings and suggestions for further 
research in this area. 
 
IPOS IN THE CHINESE CONTEXT 
 
Data and Market Characteristics 
 
 Many aspects of Chinese IPOs are unique to this market. In China, both the firm and the underwriter are 
related to the government.  Four types of buyer are distinguished: 1) State shareholders, 2) Legal person shareholders, 
3) Individual shareholders (domestic), and 4) Foreign shareholders.  Only Chinese nationals can hold „A‟ shares (and 
nationals are not allowed to buy non-A shares).  „A‟ shares are tradable in China in RMB denomination.  „B‟ shares 
trade in China in dollar denominations, and ownership is restricted to foreign investors.  „A‟ and „B‟ shares are at par 
with regard to voting rights and liquidation rights.  „C‟ shares are held by State and legal person shareholders, which 
are both government owned entities (the distinction between them is not well defined and remains ambiguous).  Some 
additional shares are traded in Hong Kong („H‟ shares) and in New York („N‟ shares). 
 
 Between December 1990 and June 1996, approximately 226 A share issues were listed on the Shanghai Stock 
Exchange.  Of these, 32 of the corporations also subsequently issued B shares.  In addition, 8 corporations issued no A 
shares but did issue B shares.  All issues involved the sale of C shares, sold only to government agencies.  We do not 
concern ourselves with C shares here, focusing on publicly issued shares. 
 
 The data on these IPOs was gathered from the Shanghai Securities Newspaper.  In addition to the offer price, 
the newspaper provides data on both the open price and the close price on the first day of trading.  This allows us to 
examine the underpricing, aftermarket return on the first trading day and the volatility on the first trading day.  
 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
 Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics of the class „B‟ IPOs (and some characteristics of all Chinese IPO‟s 
for comparison).  In terms of offer size and market price, Chinese IPOs are similar to U.S. IPOs.  In looking at class 
„A‟ shares, converted to common currency, the median offer price of RMB 4.8 is twenty-one times smaller than the 
median price of $ 12 in the U.S. (all comparisons are based on the official exchange rate of 8.5RMB/U.S. dollar).   
 
 Looking at class „B‟ issues, firms issuing type „B‟ shares are, on average, about twice the size of those issuing 
only „A‟ shares whether measured by market value (661m RMB against 363m RMB) or by total assets (232m RMB 
versus 92m RMB).  The typical offer size is twice that for „A‟ shares, so that there is a tendency for only the largest 
Chinese firm‟s to offer shares to non-nationals.  The median offer price of $0.40 per share for „B‟ shares is similar to 
that for „A‟ shares (for which the median offer price is $0.56), but is only one thirtieth the typical U.S. offer price of 
$12.   The number of shares offered for „B‟ offerings is about sixty times higher for Chinese offerings compared to US 
offerings (62 million vs. 1.1 million in the U.S. as reported by Booth and Chua, 1996).  Thus these observations 
suggest that, in China, for both „A‟ and „B‟ shares, the same size „pie‟ is sliced into very small pieces.  In the context 
of class „A‟ shares, this may be rationalized by the desire to make shares available to a widespread clientele.  However 
given that most „B‟ shares are bought by corporations or other institutions, the need for such small denomination 
issuance is less clear here.  A natural explanation for this might seem to be that the issuer wishes to ensure a similar 
“price per vote” for the „B‟ shares to that paid by „A‟ shareholders, since „A‟ and „B‟ shares offer the same rights to 
their holders.  However, recall that eight of the forty issues are for firms that do not have existing „A‟ shares 
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outstanding, and there is no difference in the offering prices on these shares from those firms that have „A‟ shares 
outstanding.  Even for these truly unseasoned „B‟ issues, offer prices are still orders of magnitude smaller than for U.S. 
new issues. 
 
 
Table 1:  Descriptive Statistics 
 
 Mean Median Range 25th percentile 75th percentile 
Firm Characteristics      
Market Value of Firm, RMB*  1058.7mil 661.113mi 222.08m-4.5394bil 426.944mil 1249.10mil 
Total Assets, RMB 262.7mil 232.0m 64mil-831.8mil 142.964mil 332.533mil 
Growth Options 3.7 3.5 1.5 to 7.3 2.89 4.135 
Number of outstanding Shares 204.3mil 187.6mi 3mil to 733mil 92.2942mil 289.283mil 
Issue Characteristics      
Offer size, $ 40.3 mil 24.4mil 11.3m to 191.6 17.48 41.377 
Offer Price, $ 3.49 0.403 0.185 to 70.9 0.34325 0.735 
Number of shares offered (mil) 62.2 65 1 to 200 31.5 95 
Retained Ownership, % 60.5 62.2 41.1 to 89.9 52.3201 67.5521 
Trading Characteristics      
Returns on 1st trading day, R1 4.83 0.57 -17.76 to 52.31 -2.6273 9.18597 
Volatility on the first trading day,  9.70 5.51 0 to 52.31 0.85045 12.6193 
Underpricing, UND 18.99 10.21 -18.45 to 87.5 0.8832 27.3009 
 
 
We turn next to an examination of the trading characteristics of the share offerings under study. 
 
We define returns on the first trading day as: 
 
R1= ((closing price on first trading day/opening price)-1) * 100. 
 
The mean return on first day trading in „B‟ shares is almost 5% (with a t-statistic of 2.06).  In contrast the 
median first day return of 0.6% is not statistically significant (with a p-value of only 0.3)
3
.  The positive expected 
returns on first day trading in „B‟ shares is in contrast to the returns on first day trading in „A‟ shares, which were zero.  
The after-market appears to be efficient in China for „A‟ shares, but not for „B‟ shares4.  Buyers in the after-market for 
„B‟ shares appear to have profit opportunities on average.  This is rather disturbing (particularly in light of the 
efficiency of the aftermarket for „A‟ shares) since one would think that the traders in „B‟ shares are sophisticated 
investors.  Because first day prices are not a random walk, in investigating underpricing of new issues, we need to 
consider whether we should compare the issue price with the opening or the closing price.  Since prices are not a 
random walk on the first day of trading, we consider two alternative measures of underpricing, based on either the 
opening or the closing price.  
 
We define underpricing as either: 
 
UND=((Closing price on first trading day/Offer Price) - 1) * 100 or                 (1) 
 
UND1 =((Opening price on first trading day/Offer Price) - 1) * 100                 (2) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
* The exchange rate has been officially managed at approximately 8.5 RMB/ U.S. $ 
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The diagram below clarifies these definitions. 
 
 
Day 1 of trading. 
 
UND1 R1 
 
Offer  Open Close 
   
UND 
 
 
We further define the volatility of returns on the first trading day as the absolute value of returns on the first 
trading day; i.e.:  R1 .
5
 
 
 The volatility on the first trading day is much higher for class „B‟ shares than has been found in studies of 
U.S. IPOs, and comparable to the volatility previously found for class „A‟ shares (9.7% for class „B‟ shares in China, 
9.3% for class „A‟ shares in China, vs. 5.6% in the U.S. as reported by Barry and Jennings (1993))6.  This suggests a 
higher level of ex-ante uncertainty about the post-offer price compared to the U.S.  While this result was not surprising 
for class „A‟ share offerings for an emerging market, given that for 32 of the „B‟ offerings, a market previously existed 
in „A‟ shares, this high degree of volatility is surprising for „B‟ shares.  We further investigated whether there was any 
difference between the volatility of first day trading prices for those class „B‟ shares that had previously issued „A‟ 
shares, and those that had not.  Surprisingly, volatility was higher for those issues with „A‟ shares already outstanding 
( = 10.15%) compared to those with no „A‟ shares outstanding ( = 4.03%).  This does not seem to fit with the idea 
that a good deal of first day volatility is due to uncertainty about the market valuation of the issue, since in that case 
we would expect the existence of outstanding „A‟ shares to reduce first day uncertainty for „B‟ shares. 
 
Section Summary 
 
 The median offer size in China for „A‟ shares is similar to U.S. IPOs; however, for „B‟ share issues, these 
firms are twice the size of a typical Chinese (or U.S.) IPO. 
 The median offer price of Chinese class „B‟ issuances is thirty times smaller than the median offer price of 
U.S. IPOs. 
 Positive profits are available by buying at the opening price in the aftermarket, on average. 
 Aftermarket prices display a high degree of volatility, even when trading in „A‟ shares predates the issuance 
of „B‟ shares. 
 
Empirical Results 
 
 As reported in Table 2, average underpricing in China is about 18%, when compared to closing prices, or 
14% when compared to opening prices.  This is comparable in magnitude to the degree of underpricing found in U.S. 
studies.
7
  A striking fact is the fact that there is only a single one of the 40 issues that exhibits any degree of 
overpricing (when compared to opening prices; 4 issues show overpricing relative to closing prices) and only 6 that 
show essentially zero (less than 1%) returns . The motivation for this consistent degree of underpricing in China is 
puzzling at first glance. It appears that buyers of class „B‟ IPOs are essentially being guaranteed a profit on their 
purchases. 
 
To explore this issue, we examine some of the explanations developed in the U.S. context to explain IPO 
underpricing.  Ibbotson (1975) and Tinic (1988) suggest that firms underprice IPOs to reduce their vulnerability to 
potentially costly lawsuits.   Rock (1986) and Beatty and Ritter (1986) propose that underpricing is required to prevent 
adverse selection against uninformed traders (a type of winner‟s curse phenomenon).  Allen and Faulhaber (1989), 
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Grinblatt and Hwang (1989), and Welch (1989) propose that firms use underpricing as a signal of quality and derive 
benefits of a better price in subsequent offerings.  Rudd (1993) argues that the observed underpricing is merely an 
artifact of the aftermarket support provided by the underwriter.  Finally recent work suggests that firms use 
underpricing to achieve a broad ownership distribution thereby increasing liquidity [Booth and Chua (1996)] and 
diffusion of control [Brennen and Franks (1995)]. 
 
 
Table 2:  Distributional Characteristics of Underpricing 
Underpricing is measured as percentage returns from the offer price to the closing price on the first trading day. 
 
Equally Weighted Mean 18.99 
t-statistic (H0= mean returns are zero) 4.77 
# of observations 40 
# of observations with positive returns 36 
# of observations with negative returns 4 
Skewness 1.122 
Kurtosis 0.73186 
Mean Return weighted by offer size 16.62 
t-statistic (H0=mean returns are zero) 4.05 
 
 
Hot and Cold Markets 
 
 Ibbotson and Jaffe (1975) find that the degree of underpricing is cyclical and concentrated in particular 
periods („Hot‟ periods).  Ritter (1984) finds that in the 1980s, the hot issue market is almost exclusively associated 
with natural resource issues.  In light of these findings, we investigate whether there are either time or industry effects 
present in our data. 
 
 As is apparent from table 3, the degree of underpricing shows signs of decline over time (this conclusion is 
subject to the limitations of the small number of offerings year by year).  Looking beyond the annual averages, we find 
that from December 1994 to the last issue of our sample (in June of 1996) no issue was underpriced by as much as 5%, 
and from February of 1994 to the end of the sample 13 of the 16 issues were underpriced by less than 6%.  Thus 
almost all of the significantly underpriced issues occurred in the first four years of the operation of the Shanghai stock 
market.  To the extent that any hot market existed in China, it appears to have been associated with the earliest IPOs. 
 
 As to whether there is any evidence of an industry effect, the only discernible difference is the small degree of 
underpricing associated with the three utility issues out of the forty
8
. 
 
The fact that the degree of  underpricing shows signs of decline over time may be consistent with the view 
that the issuer‟s motive is to create a viable trading mechanism rather than maximizing the issue proceeds, since in this 
case the early issues are critical to establishing the credibility of the market.  Over time, the need to offer the prospect 
of excess first day profits as an inducement to enter the market may decline (however, it should be noted that Datar 
and Mao (1997) found no decline in underpricing over time for the A stocks - whether this could be due to differences 
in the attitudes of domestic and foreign investors can only be speculated upon). 
 
Information Signaling  
 
Signalling models
9
 imply that higher underpricing is associated with increased likelihood of subsequent 
offering and also that underpricing is inversely related to the degree of retained ownership. We find no evidence in our 
data of the negative cross-sectional relationship between retained ownership and underpricing (see Table 4 column 8 
and Table 5 equation 4) implied by signaling models. 
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Table 3 
Underpricing is measured as percentage returns from the offer price to the closing price on the first trading day. 
 
(Panel ‘A’)”:  Underpricing By Year Of Issuance 
 
 Underpricing, UND% 
Year of IPO Number of IPOs Mean (t value) Median Range 
25th 
percentile 
75th percentile 
1992 9 7.91%(2.14) 6.75% -9.19% to 24.88% 0.95% 13.06% 
1993 13 34.94%(5.23) 29.03% 0% to 87.5% 19.19% 52.58% 
1994 12 19.38%(2.21) 4.38% -18.45% to 80% 0.25% 41.69% 
1995 2 -4.04%(-0.79) -4.04% -9.17% to 1.08% -9.17% 1.08% 
Jan-June1996 4 2.43%(2.37) 2.43% 0% to 4.86% 0.90% 3.96% 
Total 40 18.99% (4.77) 10.21 -18.45% to 87.5% 0.88% 27.3% 
 
 
(Panel ‘B’):  Underpricing By Industry 
 
 Underpricing, UND% 
Business 
Segment 
Number of IPOs Mean (t value) Median Range 25th percentile 75th percentile 
Commercial 3 30.41%(1.17) 18.67% -7.43% to 80% -7.43% 80% 
Industrial 28 19.54%(3.94) 9.90% -18.45% to 87.5% 0.65% 32.45% 
Misc. 3 22.28%(2.11) 24.29% 3.1% to 39.44% 3.1% 39.44% 
Property 3 14.08%(1.98) 19.19% 0% to 23.05% 0% 23.05% 
Utilities 3 4.07%(2.42) 3.05% 1.81% to 7.36% 1.81% 7.36% 
Total 40 18.99 (4.77) 10.21% -18.45 to 87.5% 0.88% 27.3% 
 
 
In China, the signaling motivation may have only a limited relevance to the extent that a single issuer 
(government) is issuing all the IPOs, and in this context there is no need to use a signal to separate from other issuers.
10
  
However, one may wish to take a broader view of signaling theories that the issuer wishes to „leave a good taste in the 
investor‟s mouths‟ so that future offerings from the same issuer will be well received.  To this extent underpricing may 
be an essential „signal‟, or a reputation building device on the part of the Chinese government,  knowing that 
subsequent offerings are to be made.  Perotti (1995) has modeled this phenomenon.  Our evidence of declining 
underpricing over time could be viewed as supportive of this view if the early issues are viewed as being sufficiently 
numerous to establish a reputation. 
 
Ex-Ante Uncertainty 
 
According to the winner‟s curse hypothesis, uninformed investors face adverse selection in that they get a 
larger allocation of overpriced issues.  Underpricing is essential to provide a fair return to the uninformed investors in 
the presence of this adverse selection.  At the same time, the issuer wants to maximize issue proceeds by minimizing 
underpricing.  Therefore in equilibrium the level of underpricing increases with ex-ante uncertainty about firm value.
11
 
 
 The potential for a winner‟s curse is likely to play a much stronger role in Chinese IPOs than in U.S. IPOs 
due to the existence of a single issuer in China.  For example, individual firms in the U.S. do not have an incentive to 
underprice as long as there is aggregate underpricing.  But, in the Chinese context, the issuer (the government) has a 
strong incentive to create a viable market by underpricing because the same issuer will be in the market with several 
more IPOs.  Furthermore, the prime objective of the government may be the very creation of a viable market 
mechanism rather than maximizing issue proceeds; i.e. the considerations of wide dispersion may dominate any desires 
to minimize underpricing.  Consistent with this view, in our sample almost every IPO was underpriced.  
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Table 4:  Underpricing In Portfolios 
 
The Sample consists of all B stocks listed on the Shanghai Stock Exchange, from inauguration in 1990 to June 1996.  The sample has 40 
listings/IPOs of class „B‟ shares.  The sample is broken down into sets of 5 (quintile) portfolios based on various sorting variables (explanatory 
variables). Market Value is the number of shares outstanding times the offer price.  Total Assets is book value of firm‟s assets.  Growth options is a 
ratio of first opening price divided by the book value per share.  Offer Size is the natural log of number of shares offered times the offer price.  
Retained Ownership is the percentage of listed firm that is retained by the issuer.  Aftermarket Volatility () is the absolute value of percentage 
returns on the 1 st trading day.  Aftermarket returns (R1 ) are measured as percentage returns realized from open to close on the first trading day.  
Underpricing is measured as percentage returns from the offer price to the closing price on the first trading day.  Equally weighted values of 
underpricing are reported below for the quintile portfolios.   
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1 (Lowest) 27.87% 27.68% 0.24% 8.87% 18.07% 0.24% 8.87% 22.17% 6.12% $ 3.35% $ 
2 7.47% 16.08% 22.53% 35.58% 18.75% 22.74% 32.22% 20.92% 5.38% $ 1.47% $ 
3 19.88% 11.35% 30.63% 17.37% 21.37% 35.41% * 26.45% 17.96% 19.62% $ 7.89% $ 
4 17.42% 13.13% 18.28% 7.37% 11.41% 26.91% $ 1.39% 25.35% 14.61% $ 27.65% $ 
5 (Highest) 157% 26.70% 23.27% 25.75% 25.34% 8.05% 24.18% $ 8.55% 49.21% 52.99% 
           
R2 7.3% 7.63% 16.7% 18.12% 3.4% 27.4% 19.9% 5.3% 41.5% 60% 
    *denotes significantly different from the highest quintile at the 5% level. 
    $denotes significantly different from the highest quintile at the 10% level. 
 
 
 In Table 5, we report results of regressing underpricing on several standard proxies for ex-ante uncertainty 
such as offer size, firm size, aftermarket volatility and growth options.  Table 4 reports the degree of underpricing for 
the same variables ranked into quintiles for evidence of more general correlations.  The evidence is mixed. Equation 3 
of table 5, and column 9 of table 4, both show that aftermarket uncertainty plays a role in explaining returns (this is 
still true, though less so if we use 1 as our measure of aftermarket volatility
12
).  None of the other proxies for 
uncertainty show any relationship to underpricing. 
 
 Hence, we have some limited evidence suggesting that ex-ante uncertainty does help to explain both the 
variation in underpricing and the level of underpricing (the intercept is only about 5%). However this evidence does 
not survive further scrutiny.  In particular, in this case it may be more appropriate to consider the relationship between 
UND1 and volatility.  Recall that UND measures underpricing relative to the closing price.  Since our measure of 
volatility is the absolute value of first-day returns and on average, first day returns are positive, we have an overlap in 
the time periods for measuring volatility and aftermarket returns that virtually ensures a positive relationship between 
these variables. Using UND1 (underpricing relative to opening price) the coefficient on  falls to 0.36 (t value of 1.99) 
and an R
2
 of 9.4%.  Hence, once we eliminate the overlap in time periods, the impact of aftermarket volatility becomes 
considerably less significant.  Once again, we have to recall that for many of these issues, existing „A‟ share prices are 
available which one might expect would alleviate the adverse selection problem.  We are left to conclude that this data 
seems to be consistent with the notion that the issuer is concerned about the potential failure of an issue (due to 
uncertainty and adverse selection) but not particularly concerned about maximizing issue proceeds (or minimizing 
underpricing) and therefore selects a high level of average underpricing and this is consistent with finding no 
relationship between underpricing and uncertainty. 
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Table 5:  What’s Driving The Underpricing?:  Regression Evidence 
 
The Sample consists of all class „B‟ stocks (40 listings) listed on the Shanghai Stock Exchange, from inauguration in 1990 to June 1996.  LOSZ is 
the natural log of number of shares offered times the offering price.  LMVAL is the natural log of number of shares outstanding times the offering 
price.  Aftermarket Volatility () is the absolute value of percentage returns on the 1st trading day.  Retained Ownership is the percentage of listed 
firm that is retained by the issuer.  „Growth options‟ is a ratio of first opening price divided by the book value per share.  Aftermarket returns on 
the 1st day (R1) are measured as percentage returns realized from open to close on the first trading day. LPRC is the log of offer price. In equations 
1-8, the dependent variable is underpricing, this is measured as percentage returns realized from offer to close on the first trading day.  In 
equation 9 the dependent variable in uderpricing measured as percentage returns from offer to open on the first trading day (t-statistics are in 
parentheses). 
 
E
q
u
a
ti
o
n
 #
 
In
te
r
c
e
p
t 
L
O
S
Z
 (
L
o
g
 
o
f 
O
ff
e
r
 
S
iz
e
),
 
$
, 
M
il
li
o
n
s 
L
M
V
A
L
 
(L
o
g
 o
f 
F
ir
m
 S
iz
e
),
 
$
, 
M
il
li
o
n
s 
A
ft
e
r
m
a
r
k
e
t 
V
o
la
ti
li
ty
 
(
),
 %
 
R
e
ta
in
e
d
 
O
w
n
e
r
sh
ip
 
%
 
G
ro
w
th
 
O
p
ti
o
n
s 
A
ft
e
r
m
a
r
k
e
t 
r
e
tu
r
n
s,
 
R
1
, 
%
 
L
P
R
C
, 
L
o
g
 
o
f 
O
ff
e
r
 
P
r
ic
e
, 
$
 
1 21.75 (19.78) 
-0.814 (-0.14) 
R2 =.05% 
      
2 15.45 (35.03)  
0.527 (0.10) 
R2=0.03% 
     
3 4.285 (3.55)   
1.52 (6.6) 
R2=53.3% 
    
4 30.49 (25.11)    
-0.19 (-0.4) 
R2=0.56% 
   
5 6.47 (11.73)     
3.4 (1.13) 
R2= 3.3% 
  
6 12.15 (2.36)      
1.41 (9.2) 
R2= 69.23% 
 
7 
18.46 
(4.08) 
      
-1.98 (-0.7) 
R2=1.26% 
8 
15.03 
(22.18) 
0.99 
(6.33) 
     
-2.19 (-0.69) 
R2  = 1.3% 
Dependent variable in equation 9 is  UND1 
9    
0.36(1.99) 
R2 = 9.4% 
    
 
 
Other Explanations 
 
 Given that the issuer of all these IPOs is the government, lawsuit avoidance is unlikely to be a motivation for 
underpricing.  Control aspects are very unlikely to play a meaningful role in underpricing (and associated broad 
dispersion) because the government owns at least 50% of the shares in most IPOs.  Aftermarket price support is 
non-existent and therefore has no role in observed underpricing.  As noted above, traditional signaling considerations 
are moot because a single issuer (government) offers all the IPOs. 
 
 We propose that the Chinese IPOs are underpriced primarily to promote a viable capital market (rather than 
to maximize individual issue proceeds).   The lack of support for alternative explanations of IPO underpricing and the 
evidence on the uniformity of underpricing is consistent with this proposition, as is, possibly, the concentration of 
severely underpriced issues in the early years of the stock market. 
 
SECTION SUMMARY 
 
 The level of IPO underpricing is comparable in size to U.S. IPOs. Furthermore, almost every issue is 
underpriced.  There appears to be some tendency for underpricing to have fallen over time. 
 There is no evidence of signaling; a) the incidence of subsequent issues is unrelated to the level of prior 
underpricing, b) the degree of retained ownership has no impact on the level of underpricing. 
 Ex-ante uncertainty has very marginal impact on the variation in underpricing and on the level of 
underpricing. 
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 The issuer has a preference for a small offer price regardless of the offer size, suggesting that the issuer wants 
to make the issues affordable to a broad clientele, at least domestically. 
 
 Overall, the evidence suggests that the issuer deliberately underpriced the issues to achieve acceptance of 
these new issues, while possibly sacrificing issue proceeds in the interest of establishing the market. 
 
SUMMARY AND UNANSWERED QUESTIONS 
 
 This study examines IPOs of „B‟ shares listed on the Shanghai stock exchange sold to non-Chinese nationals 
as of June 1996, representing 40 IPOs.  For an emerging market, these issues are not economically insignificant; in fact 
a typical issue is larger than the average U.S. IPO in terms of both offer size and firm size. 
 
 We find that the mean underpricing is comparable to that observed in the U.S. (18% in China vs. 16.4% in the 
U.S.).  Furthermore, almost every issue is underpriced (as against just the average issue being underpriced), although 
there is evidence that the degree of underpricing is declining over time. Looking at the aftermarket, the market appears 
to be inefficient in the sense that on average the first aftermarket price does provide a profit opportunity. 
 
 Most explanations of underpricing in the U.S. context rely on the issuer‟s desire to maximize issue proceeds 
in the presence of the adverse selection faced by investors.  This view does not fully explain the nature and extent of 
underpricing in Chinese data.  We suggest that the Chinese government has deliberately underpriced IPOs in order to 
create a viable capital market; i.e. dispersion motives dominate any desires to minimize underpricing.   
 
 What makes these share issues of particular interest is the existence of class „A‟ shares issued to Chinese 
citizens, giving the class „B‟ issue the flavor of both an IPO and a seasoned issue.  The existence of underpricing for 
the class „B‟ issues is particularly surprising given the existence of currently trading class „A‟ shares.  At least three 
erroneous issues should be dismissed in examining the difference in the pricing of A and B shares. 
 
 Arbitrage discipline is limited due to restrictions on ownership of the shares.  This argument lacks validity 
since the existence of many Chinese nationals in Hong Kong means that the strict division of ownership 
between A and B shares is in fact far from clear cut. 
 B shares bear additional currency risk.  This statement is not correct since B shares are priced in dollars, so 
there is no additional currency risk for foreign holders of these shares. 
 Chinese shares bear unusual risks and this explains the underpricing.  This notion is clearly incorrect.  While 
it may be true that Chinese shares bear unusual risks, there is no reason why these risks should be associated 
particularly with the day of issue.  It may well be that these shares will offer higher returns over time as 
compensation for the risk associated with the unstable situation in China, but there is no reason why initial 
buyers in particular are bearing any special risk. 
 
Clearly study of these share issues has the potential to produce a number of novel insights into the operation 
of share markets in developing and transforming economies.  A number of issues that bear further analysis if the 
appropriate information can be gathered could cast further light on our findings. In particular it would be desirable to 
know: 
 
 Do „A‟ and „B‟ shares trade at par over time (appropriately adjusted for exchange rates, which may not be 
trivial issue given the existence of an official and an unofficial exchange rate for RMB) 
 What is the price of „A‟ shares in the companies that issue „B‟ shares on the days around the new issues of „B‟ 
shares? 
 What happens to the prices of „B‟ shares over time?  Given that prices are not a random walk on the first 
trading day, it would be of interest to know if either the opening or closing prices are efficient estimates of 
future prices. 
 
 
International Business & Economic Research Journal – August 2005                                        Volume 4, Number 8 
 10 
_____________________________________________ 
David Mao hand collected the data while working with Herbert Smith law offices, in Hong Kong.  We thank faculty 
members at Seattle University for valuable comments.  All errors are our own. 
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ENDNOTES 
 
 
1. For reviews of U.S. and International IPO underpricing, see Smith (1986), Ibbotson and Ritter (1993), and 
Loughran, Ritter and Rydqvist (1994). 
2. Datar and Mao (1997) examine 226 IPOs for class „A‟ share issues to Chinese nationals, and find that these 
IPOs were underpriced by 388% on average, compared to an underpricing of 16% in the U.S..  Furthermore 
they find that almost every issue is underpriced. 
3. The discrepancy between the mean and median value here cannot be attributed to the presence of an outlier.  
Four stocks offered first day returns over 25% (and an additional three offered first day returns over 15%), 
whereas only one stock generated losses of over 15% on the first day.  Twelve of the forty issues generated 
first day returns between -2% and +2%. 
4. Barry and Jennings (1993) report that the aftermarket price is a random walk for U.S. data. 
5. Since E(R1) is not equal to zero, we also used as an alternative measure of volatility, 1 = R1 - E(R1).  
6. Using 1  as our measure of volatility, the mean is 10.42% and the median is 5.93%. 
7. Ibbotson, Sindelar and Ritter (1988) examine 8668 IPOs in the U.S. and report average underpricing of 
16.4%. 
8. It may not be clear cut that these time and industry effects are two seperate effects, since two of the three 
utility issues occurred in 1996, and two of the four issues in 1996 were utility stocks. 
9. See Allen and Fallhaber (1989), Grinblatt and Hwang (1989), Welch (1989), Chemmanur (1993), Leland and 
Pyle (1977), and Gale and Stiglitz (1989). 
10. In this view, the lack of evidence for any relationship between retained ownership and underpricing reported 
above is actually good news for signaling models in general, since signaling motives have limited relevance in 
the Chinese context (at individual issue level); it would have been damaging if the implications of signaling 
models were to bear out in absence of any signaling motives. 
11. For example see, Rock (1986), and Beatty and Ritter (1986). 
12. See footnote number 5 for a definition of 1.  Using this measure we obtain a coefficient of 1.29 on 1 (t 
statistic, 3.89) and an R
2 
of 26%. 
 
 
 
 
 
International Business & Economic Research Journal – August 2005                                        Volume 4, Number 8 
 12 
 
NOTES 
